SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND SHOULD BE RATIONAL TO AVOID THE TROUBLES OF THE SOUTH. By advocate Mohamed Ahmed Abdi Ba'alul

SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND SHOULD BE RATIONAL TO AVOID  THE TROUBLES OF THE SOUTH.

 By advocate Mohamed Ahmed Abdi Ba'alul (waddi12@gmail.com)

Advocate Ba'alul.

SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND SHOULD ACT RATIONALLY TO AVOID REPLICATING SOUTHERN CONFLICTS
Exporting the political instability of southern Somalia to the north does not offer any meaningful solution to the suffering of populations in Mogadishu and Kismayo. On the contrary, it risks destabilizing the relatively peaceful and institutionally stronger regions of Somaliland and Puntland, which have historically maintained a degree of autonomy from the chronic warfare and fragmented politics of the south.
At one point, the presidency of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo appeared to symbolize a potential shift toward stability, particularly to those familiar with his earlier role in Sheikh Sharif’s transitional government. However, his tenure ultimately revealed the limitations of inexperience and the dangers of being drawn into regional geopolitical rivalries without a coherent long-term strategy. Instead of consolidating internal governance and reconciliation, his administration increasingly became entangled in external power struggles that undermined regional stability.
A clear example of this was his government’s confrontation with Somaliland’s expanding economic partnerships, particularly the development of Berbera Port through agreements involving the UAE and Ethiopia. Rather than recognizing the broader economic benefits such investments could generate for the Horn of Africa, his administration appeared to prioritize geopolitical alignment with certain allies, notably Qatar and Turkey, over regional economic integration. This was reflected in the parliamentary decision to challenge the tripartite agreement, the controversial removal of Speaker Mohamed Osman Jawari, and reported diplomatic efforts to obstruct the investment deal at the international level. More concerning was the subsequent militarization along border areas, which risks escalating tensions under the influence of clan-based political calculations.
In contrast, relations between Somaliland and Puntland have historically demonstrated that cooperation is both possible and beneficial. Despite political differences, the two administrations have shared overlapping interests in security coordination, trade facilitation, and social mobility. Somaliland’s relative institutional stability has, in many ways, served as an informal model for Puntland, which remains one of the more functional regional administrations in Somalia.
Both Somaliland and Puntland have also independently pursued economic partnerships with international actors such as the United Arab Emirates, despite opposition from the Federal Government in Mogadishu. From a Somaliland perspective, such decisions reflect legitimate efforts by regional administrations to develop infrastructure and attract investment—similar to how Mogadishu itself has benefited from Turkish-supported development of its ports and airports.
It is therefore misleading to interpret military posturing across regional borders as hostility toward civilian populations. In reality, many in Somaliland recognize that Puntland’s stability is strategically important, as it acts as a buffer against the spillover of instability from southern Somalia.
The long-standing disputes over Sool and Sanaag are also often misrepresented through simplistic narratives of clan-based expansionism. These tensions did not originally stem from a coherent ideology of “Darodism,” as sometimes claimed, but rather from politically motivated processes that intensified during the era of Abdullahi Yusuf. His inclusion of Dhulbahante and Warsangeli representatives in the Garowe state formation process was widely viewed as a strategic move aimed at weakening Somaliland’s pursuit of recognition, rather than a purely inclusive governance initiative.
It is also notable that Somaliland did not adopt an interventionist posture during Puntland’s formation and did not attempt to disrupt its foundational political process. Even Abdullahi Yusuf himself acknowledged that Somaliland’s internal system contains structural challenges. However, such challenges are best addressed internally by the communities directly affected, rather than through external interference.
At the same time, Somaliland should strengthen its political inclusivity and demonstrate greater flexibility in addressing the concerns of communities in Sool and Sanaag. Greater openness in discussing the political future of the state—particularly with non-Isaaq communities—would enhance legitimacy and reduce tensions.
Scholars and political voices such as Ali Khalif, Ahmed Ismail Samatar, and Hagle-Tosiye have repeatedly emphasized that regions like Sool and Awdal should not remain passive observers of political developments. Instead, they should actively participate as stakeholders in shaping their political future within any evolving governance framework.
In conclusion, the stability of the northern regions depends on rational political conduct, restraint from external interference, and a commitment to dialogue over confrontation. Unlike the south, which remains trapped in cycles of militarized politics, Somaliland and Puntland have an opportunity to strengthen governance through cooperation, inclusivity, and economic integration rather than rivalry and escalation.