Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium: Executive Overreach, Patronage Networks, and the Imperative of Parliamentary Fiscal Gatekeeping By Garyaq Maxamed Axmed Cabdi (Bacaluul)

Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium: Executive Overreach, Patronage Networks, and the Imperative of Parliamentary Fiscal Gatekeeping

I. The Normative Rule: Constitutional Equilibrium and the Separation of Powers

The structural integrity of the Somaliland constitutional order depends on a clear division of institutional powers. The legislature holds the primary law-making function and, most importantly for present purposes, the Power of the Public Purse. This includes the constitutional authority to authorize public expenditure, approve the national budget, and establish independent public administration institutions through legislation.

The executive has a different role. Article 90 of the Constitution gives the President and the executive authority to administer the law, direct national policy, and organize the internal administration of government. This necessarily includes the power to establish departments, directorates, and other administrative units within existing ministries where they are needed for effective day-to-day administration.

That power, however, should not be confused with a general authority to create entirely new autonomous public institutions. There is a legal difference between reorganizing the internal structure of an existing ministry and creating a separate public body with its own mandate, budget, personnel, and governance structure. The former is an administrative function. The latter raises a question of institutional creation that ordinarily belongs within the legislative framework.

This distinction provides the starting point for assessing the growth of Somaliland's public administration. A public institution should derive its authority either directly from the Constitution or from legislation enacted by Parliament. Where the executive proposes a new autonomous body, it should therefore place the institutional proposal before the legislature rather than treating an executive decree as sufficient to create a separate organ of government.

Methodological Note

This analysis operates at the macro-structural and constitutional level. It is concerned with institutional patterns rather than with auditing individual transactions or identifying misconduct by particular officials.

The central questions therefore concern the design of the public administration, the balance between the executive and legislature, the repeated use of executive decrees to establish new bodies, and the way those bodies subsequently enter the public budget. Requiring evidence of individual wrongdoing in every case would miss the nature of the argument. A structural problem can exist without every individual action within the system amounting to a separate legal violation. The concern here is the broader institutional pattern and its effect on constitutional accountability, public expenditure, and administrative coherence.

II. Institutional Classification: The Legal and Functional Axes

To assess Somaliland's public administration properly, institutions should be examined along two separate dimensions: legality and function. Legality asks how an institution was established and what legal authority supports it. Function asks what the institution actually does and whether that function is necessary.

Keeping these questions separate is important. An institution may perform a useful function but lack an adequate legal foundation. Conversely, an institution may have a valid legal foundation but perform functions that unnecessarily duplicate those of another public body. Legal authority and administrative usefulness are therefore related questions, but they are not the same question.

1. The Legal Axis: Origin and Authority

On the legal axis, public administration institutions can be grouped into three broad categories:

·        Constitutionally Established PAIs: institutions directly established, mandated, or constitutionally anchored, such as the Council of Ministers, the Judiciary, and the Auditor General.

·        Statutorily Established PAIs: institutions created and governed by legislation enacted by Parliament, including core ministries and statutory bodies such as the Central Bank and the Civil Service Commission.

·        Non-Statutory or Extra-Constitutional PAIs: bodies established through executive decrees, presidential orders, or administrative circulars without a prior parliamentary statute establishing them as independent public institutions.

2. The Functional Axis: Operational Utility and Scope

The second axis concerns the actual role performed by an institution. On this basis, institutions can be understood as follows:

·        Core Service-Delivery Bodies: institutions responsible for frontline public services, revenue collection, security, health, education, and other statutory regulatory functions.

·        Redundant or Overlapping Bodies: institutions whose mandates duplicate functions already assigned to existing ministries or statutory public institutions.

·        Ad-Hoc or Nominal Secretariats: bodies that do not perform substantial frontline public services but operate mainly as specialized boards, committees, or administrative taskforces.

Integrated Taxonomic Matrix

Institutional Category

Legal Basis

Functional Role

Structural Status

Category A: Legitimate Constitutional and Statutory Organs

Constitution or enacted statute

Core governance or frontline public services

Lawful and operational: grounded in constitutional or legislative authority and subject to the applicable oversight mechanisms.

Category B: Lawful Administrative Units

Executive authority under Article 90

Internal ministerial organization, departments, directorates, and operational units

Lawful and internal: operates within an existing institutional framework without creating a separate autonomous public body.

Category C: Extra-Constitutional Autonomous Bodies

Executive decree without supporting statute

Autonomous administration, parallel regulation, or specialized boards

Legally anomalous: creates a distinct institutional structure without the legislative foundation normally required for an independent public body.


III. Executive Deviation: The Abuse of Decrees and Administrative Sprawl

The constitutional balance becomes difficult to maintain when the executive uses unilateral decrees to create Category C institutions as independent public bodies. The problem is not the use of executive instruments themselves. Executive orders and administrative decisions are necessary tools of government. The problem arises when they are used not merely to organize existing administration, but to create new autonomous institutions with separate mandates, personnel, budgets, and authority.

When this happens, an administrative instrument begins to perform a function that should be subject to legislative scrutiny. The executive is no longer simply implementing an institutional framework established by law; it is expanding that framework on its own initiative.

This creates a particular risk in a political system where institutional creation also creates opportunities for the distribution of public positions and resources. Without effective legislative scrutiny, newly created offices can become instruments of political patronage rather than mechanisms for delivering necessary public services.

The risks are particularly clear in three areas.

First, public resources can become political rewards. Ad-hoc commissions and newly created offices may provide political allies or influential individuals with access to public salaries, offices, and administrative benefits outside established civil-service structures.

Second, institutional expansion can reinforce political loyalty. Creating additional offices gives the executive more positions through which political support can be maintained or rewarded. Bureaucratic expansion can therefore become connected to the maintenance of political networks.

Third, decree-based creation can avoid the public-utility question. Before creating a new institution, government should be able to answer a basic question: What specific public need requires this institution, and why cannot that need be addressed through an existing body? When an institution is created without meaningful legislative debate, that question may never receive adequate public examination.

The concern, therefore, is not that every institution created by executive action is necessarily a patronage instrument. The concern is that a system which allows autonomous institutions to be created without effective legislative scrutiny creates the conditions in which unnecessary expansion and patronage become easier.

IV. Political Motivation, Limited Fiscal Space, and Rent-Seeking

The institutional problem becomes more serious when it is considered alongside Somaliland's limited fiscal capacity. Public administration requires continuing expenditure. Every new institution creates costs for salaries, offices, equipment, administration, and other recurrent needs. Those costs compete directly with other public priorities.

The national budget is approximately US$655 million, including a central government envelope of roughly $409 million, local government allocations of about $80.5 million, and the remaining resources distributed through development funds and revenue agencies. In such a constrained fiscal environment, institutional expansion cannot be judged simply by asking whether a new office performs some useful activity.

The more important question is what the state gives up in order to maintain it.

This is particularly important where frontline public services already face serious resource constraints. Hospitals may lack essential supplies, schools may lack basic facilities and utilities, and public administration may still depend heavily on manual systems. In that environment, the continued creation of specialized commissions and administrative offices cannot be considered in isolation. The state must also consider the opportunity cost of maintaining them.

The issue, therefore, is not only whether an institution is legally established. It is whether the institution represents a reasonable use of scarce public resources.

The Empirical Reality of Personnel Bloat in the 2026 Budget

The fiscal problem becomes even clearer when public expenditure is examined from the perspective of personnel costs. According to the figures cited in this analysis, approximately 69% of the state's discretionary operational capacity is consumed by personnel expenses, including wages, salaries, and staffing-related costs. This leaves roughly 31% for non-payroll operational and capital expenditure.

Such a high personnel burden has consequences beyond the size of the civil service. It affects what government can actually do with the resources that remain after salaries have been paid.

One consequence is what may be described as the "Empty Desk" effect. The state may have employees in place, but those employees may lack the resources needed to perform their jobs effectively. Teachers may work without adequate teaching materials, doctors may work without sufficient medicines, and police officers may lack fuel, equipment, or other basic operational resources. The result is a public administration in which the formal existence of personnel does not necessarily translate into effective service delivery.

The same pressure affects infrastructure. When personnel expenditure absorbs most of the available fiscal space, less money remains for capital investment, maintenance, and the development of public assets. Infrastructure may therefore deteriorate not because government has no employees, but because too little of the available budget remains for the physical and operational requirements of government.

The third problem is fiscal vulnerability. A government with very little flexibility after meeting its payroll obligations has limited capacity to absorb an unexpected fall in revenue or a wider economic shock. A reduction in trade revenue, for example, can quickly create pressure for additional borrowing, increased dependence on external assistance, or delays in salary payments.

These problems give practical significance to the constitutional argument. Administrative expansion is not simply a matter of how many institutions appear on a government organizational chart. Each additional institution can add permanent personnel and operating costs to an already constrained fiscal system.

From this broader perspective, the "parasitic drain" refers not to individual officers who may or may not be acting improperly. It refers to a pattern of priority inversion: scarce public revenue is increasingly committed to maintaining an expanding administrative structure and payroll while essential state functions remain under-resourced.

The central concern is therefore systemic. When public offices can be created and funded without effective legislative scrutiny, the state risks directing resources toward institutional expansion rather than toward the public functions those resources are ultimately intended to serve.

V. Parliamentary Failure: The Abdication of Fiscal Guardrails

Executive expansion is only one side of the problem. The other is the failure of Parliament to use the constitutional powers available to it.

When Parliament fails to question or scrutinize executive-created institutions during the budget process, it weakens its own role as guardian of the Power of the Public Purse. The executive may create an administrative body, but that does not by itself guarantee that Parliament must finance it.

This distinction is crucial. Institutional creation and public funding are separate questions. An executive decree may create an administrative arrangement, but the request for public money brings that institution directly into the legislative budget process. At that point, Parliament has the opportunity—and the constitutional responsibility—to ask whether the proposed expenditure is justified.

If Parliament simply accommodates non-statutory bodies through annual appropriation acts or accepts executive reallocations without meaningful scrutiny, the problem compounds over time. More offices are added, existing mandates begin to overlap, administrative costs increase, and responsibility becomes increasingly difficult to identify.

The result is not simply a larger bureaucracy. It is a less coherent system of public administration in which institutions may perform overlapping functions while operating with different levels of legal and parliamentary accountability.

VI. Corrective Remedy: Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium

The appropriate response is not necessarily to abolish every institution created by executive action. Nor should Parliament assume that every such institution must automatically be rejected because it lacks a separate enabling statute.

The more important corrective is to restore Parliament's role as the fiscal and legislative gatekeeper. When an institution seeks public funding, Parliament should examine the institution, its functions, its necessity, and its cost before deciding whether to appropriate public money.

1. The Gatekeeping Mandate: Rejecting Automatic Entitlement to Public Funds

Article 55(1) gives the House of Representatives authority to debate, amend, and approve the national budget. Article 53 also provides part of the constitutional framework for parliamentary oversight of public institutions and executive action.

Parliament therefore should not treat the executive's proposed budget as a document that merely requires formal approval. The executive may propose an institution and request funding for it, but its unilateral creation of that institution does not automatically give it an entitlement to public financing.

This is where Parliament's fiscal gatekeeping role becomes decisive.

When a non-statutory or otherwise executive-created institution appears in the proposed budget, Parliament should ask whether the institution performs a genuine public function and whether that function justifies the expenditure requested. The process does not have to operate on the rigid assumption that every form of public funding is constitutionally prohibited until an enabling Act has first been enacted. Instead, the budget process itself can operate as a constitutional filtering mechanism.

The process can be understood in three stages:

Executive establishment and funding request. The executive establishes or proposes the institution and submits the relevant budget request.

Parliamentary interrogation. Parliament examines the proposed institution and requires the executive to explain its mandate, necessity, expected public benefit, and financial implications.

Legislative determination. If Parliament is persuaded that the institution performs a demonstrable public function, it may approve the requested appropriation. It may also require the institution to be placed on a proper statutory footing. If Parliament is not persuaded, it may exercise its constitutional budgetary authority under Article 55 and decline to appropriate the requested funds.

This approach preserves the constitutional role of both branches. The executive can propose and administer; Parliament decides whether public money should be appropriated for the proposed activity.

2. The Three-Part Legislative Evaluation Framework

Before approving a budget line for a decree-created or non-statutory institution, Parliament should apply three basic tests.

First: Public Necessity. What concrete public need does the institution address? The executive should provide a clear explanation of the problem the institution is intended to solve, the service it will provide, and the public benefit expected from it. Political assertions alone should not be enough.

Second: Institutional Overlap and Subsidiarity. Does the proposed mandate duplicate or conflict with functions already assigned to an existing constitutional or statutory institution? If an existing body can perform the same function effectively, the government should explain why another institution is necessary.

Third: Fiscal Sustainability and Resource Burden. What will the institution cost over time? The assessment should include salaries, staffing, offices, equipment, infrastructure, and recurring administrative expenditure. Given the reported 69% personnel burden, the question is particularly important: can the state sustain another institutional structure without further reducing the resources available for essential services and capital investment?

Together, these three tests would give parliamentary budget review a more meaningful institutional function. The question would not simply be whether an institution has requested money. The question would be whether the institution is necessary, sufficiently distinct, and financially sustainable.

VII. Comparative Case Illustration: Structural Efficiency vs. Extra-Constitutional Redundancy

The difference between the two institutional models can be summarized as follows:

Operational Domain

Constitutional / Statutory PAI — Legitimate Track

Non-Statutory / Extra-Constitutional PAI — Patronage Risk

Legal Mandate

Based on the Constitution or legislation enacted by Parliament.

Created through an executive decree, administrative circular, or presidential taskforce without legislative establishment as an independent institution.

Fiscal Accountability

Subject to established audit procedures and parliamentary budgetary scrutiny.

May operate through discretionary allocations, donor-related arrangements, or reallocations that receive less institutional scrutiny.

Operational Output

Performs recognized public functions such as education, health, security, justice, revenue administration, or other statutory services.

May consume salaries, office space, and administrative resources while performing functions that overlap with existing institutions.

The comparison should not be understood to mean that every non-statutory institution is useless or that every statutory institution is efficient. The point is more precise: legal foundation and functional necessity are separate questions, and both must be examined.

An institution may provide a useful service while still requiring a stronger legal foundation. Likewise, an institution may have a valid legal foundation but nevertheless become redundant or inefficient. The proper response is therefore not to judge institutions solely by their names or their claimed functions, but to examine their legal basis, actual mandate, relationship with existing institutions, and cost to the public.

Conclusion

Somaliland cannot afford unlimited institutional expansion while operating within a tightly constrained fiscal environment and carrying a personnel burden that consumes approximately 69% of available fiscal space.

The issue is not simply the number of offices in government. It is the constitutional process through which those offices are created, funded, and maintained.

The executive has an important administrative role under Article 90, including the authority to organize the internal machinery of government. That authority should not, however, be treated as a general power to create independent public institutions without meaningful legislative involvement.

At the same time, Parliament must do more than criticize executive expansion after the fact. Its most effective constitutional instrument is its control over public expenditure. The executive may establish an administrative body and request funding for it, but the existence of an executive decree does not itself create a constitutional entitlement to parliamentary appropriation.

Parliament should therefore use the budget process as a genuine constitutional gatekeeping mechanism. It should ask whether a proposed institution is necessary, whether its functions overlap with existing institutions, and whether the state can reasonably sustain its costs. Where the case is convincing, Parliament can approve the appropriation and, where appropriate, require formal statutory regularization. Where the case is not convincing, Parliament can refuse the requested appropriation.

This approach restores the proper balance between the two branches. The executive remains capable of administering government, while Parliament retains its constitutional responsibility to determine how public resources are authorized and allocated.

Constitutional equilibrium does not require an inactive executive or a hostile legislature. It requires each branch to exercise its own powers within the constitutional framework. Executive administration should not become a substitute for legislation, and parliamentary budget approval should not become a passive formality. The protection of the public purse is one of the principal means through which constitutional government protects the public interest.

 


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