Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium: Executive Overreach, Patronage Networks, and the Imperative of Parliamentary Fiscal Gatekeeping By Garyaq Maxamed Axmed Cabdi (Bacaluul)
Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium: Executive Overreach, Patronage Networks, and the Imperative of Parliamentary Fiscal Gatekeeping
I. The Normative Rule: Constitutional Equilibrium and the Separation of Powers
The structural integrity of the Somaliland constitutional order depends on a
clear division of institutional powers. The legislature holds the primary
law-making function and, most importantly for present purposes, the Power
of the Public Purse. This includes the constitutional authority to
authorize public expenditure, approve the national budget, and establish
independent public administration institutions through legislation.
The executive has a different role. Article 90 of the
Constitution gives the President and the executive authority to administer the
law, direct national policy, and organize the internal administration of
government. This necessarily includes the power to establish departments,
directorates, and other administrative units within existing ministries where
they are needed for effective day-to-day administration.
That power, however, should not be confused with a general authority to
create entirely new autonomous public institutions. There is a legal difference
between reorganizing the internal structure of an existing ministry and
creating a separate public body with its own mandate, budget, personnel, and
governance structure. The former is an administrative function. The latter
raises a question of institutional creation that ordinarily belongs within the
legislative framework.
This distinction provides the starting point for assessing the growth of
Somaliland's public administration. A public institution should derive its
authority either directly from the Constitution or from legislation enacted by
Parliament. Where the executive proposes a new autonomous body, it should
therefore place the institutional proposal before the legislature rather than
treating an executive decree as sufficient to create a separate organ of
government.
Methodological Note
This analysis operates at the macro-structural and constitutional
level. It is concerned with institutional patterns rather than with
auditing individual transactions or identifying misconduct by particular
officials.
The central questions therefore concern the design of the public
administration, the balance between the executive and legislature, the repeated
use of executive decrees to establish new bodies, and the way those bodies
subsequently enter the public budget. Requiring evidence of individual
wrongdoing in every case would miss the nature of the argument. A structural
problem can exist without every individual action within the system amounting
to a separate legal violation. The concern here is the broader institutional
pattern and its effect on constitutional accountability, public expenditure,
and administrative coherence.
II. Institutional Classification: The Legal and Functional Axes
To assess Somaliland's public administration properly, institutions should
be examined along two separate dimensions: legality and function.
Legality asks how an institution was established and what legal authority
supports it. Function asks what the institution actually does and whether that
function is necessary.
Keeping these questions separate is important. An institution may perform a
useful function but lack an adequate legal foundation. Conversely, an
institution may have a valid legal foundation but perform functions that
unnecessarily duplicate those of another public body. Legal authority and
administrative usefulness are therefore related questions, but they are not the
same question.
1. The Legal Axis:
Origin and Authority
On the legal axis, public administration institutions can be grouped into
three broad categories:
·
Constitutionally Established PAIs:
institutions directly established, mandated, or constitutionally anchored, such
as the Council of Ministers, the Judiciary, and the Auditor General.
·
Statutorily Established PAIs:
institutions created and governed by legislation enacted by Parliament,
including core ministries and statutory bodies such as the Central Bank and the
Civil Service Commission.
·
Non-Statutory or Extra-Constitutional
PAIs: bodies established through executive decrees, presidential
orders, or administrative circulars without a prior parliamentary statute
establishing them as independent public institutions.
2. The Functional
Axis: Operational Utility and Scope
The second axis concerns the actual role performed by an institution. On
this basis, institutions can be understood as follows:
·
Core Service-Delivery Bodies:
institutions responsible for frontline public services, revenue collection,
security, health, education, and other statutory regulatory functions.
·
Redundant or Overlapping Bodies:
institutions whose mandates duplicate functions already assigned to existing
ministries or statutory public institutions.
·
Ad-Hoc or Nominal Secretariats:
bodies that do not perform substantial frontline public services but operate
mainly as specialized boards, committees, or administrative taskforces.
Integrated
Taxonomic Matrix
|
Institutional
Category |
Legal
Basis |
Functional
Role |
Structural
Status |
|
Category
A: Legitimate Constitutional and Statutory Organs |
Constitution or enacted
statute |
Core governance or
frontline public services |
Lawful
and operational:
grounded in constitutional or legislative authority and subject to the
applicable oversight mechanisms. |
|
Category
B: Lawful Administrative Units |
Executive authority under
Article 90 |
Internal ministerial
organization, departments, directorates, and operational units |
Lawful
and internal:
operates within an existing institutional framework without creating a
separate autonomous public body. |
|
Category
C: Extra-Constitutional Autonomous Bodies |
Executive decree without
supporting statute |
Autonomous administration,
parallel regulation, or specialized boards |
Legally
anomalous:
creates a distinct institutional structure without the legislative foundation
normally required for an independent public body. |
III. Executive Deviation: The Abuse of Decrees and Administrative Sprawl
The constitutional balance becomes difficult to maintain when the executive
uses unilateral decrees to create Category C institutions as
independent public bodies. The problem is not the use of executive instruments
themselves. Executive orders and administrative decisions are necessary tools
of government. The problem arises when they are used not merely to organize
existing administration, but to create new autonomous institutions with
separate mandates, personnel, budgets, and authority.
When this happens, an administrative instrument begins to perform a function
that should be subject to legislative scrutiny. The executive is no longer
simply implementing an institutional framework established by law; it is
expanding that framework on its own initiative.
This creates a particular risk in a political system where institutional
creation also creates opportunities for the distribution of public positions
and resources. Without effective legislative scrutiny, newly created offices
can become instruments of political patronage rather than mechanisms for
delivering necessary public services.
The risks are particularly clear in three areas.
First, public resources can become political rewards.
Ad-hoc commissions and newly created offices may provide political allies or
influential individuals with access to public salaries, offices, and
administrative benefits outside established civil-service structures.
Second, institutional expansion can reinforce political loyalty.
Creating additional offices gives the executive more positions through which
political support can be maintained or rewarded. Bureaucratic expansion can
therefore become connected to the maintenance of political networks.
Third, decree-based creation can avoid the public-utility question.
Before creating a new institution, government should be able to answer a basic
question: What specific public need requires this institution, and why
cannot that need be addressed through an existing body? When an
institution is created without meaningful legislative debate, that question may
never receive adequate public examination.
The concern, therefore, is not that every institution created by executive
action is necessarily a patronage instrument. The concern is that a system
which allows autonomous institutions to be created without effective
legislative scrutiny creates the conditions in which unnecessary expansion and
patronage become easier.
IV. Political Motivation, Limited Fiscal Space, and Rent-Seeking
The institutional problem becomes more serious when it is considered
alongside Somaliland's limited fiscal capacity. Public administration requires
continuing expenditure. Every new institution creates costs for salaries,
offices, equipment, administration, and other recurrent needs. Those costs
compete directly with other public priorities.
The national budget is approximately US$655 million,
including a central government envelope of roughly $409 million,
local government allocations of about $80.5 million, and the
remaining resources distributed through development funds and revenue agencies.
In such a constrained fiscal environment, institutional expansion cannot be
judged simply by asking whether a new office performs some useful activity.
The more important question is what the state gives up in order to maintain
it.
This is particularly important where frontline public services already face
serious resource constraints. Hospitals may lack essential supplies, schools
may lack basic facilities and utilities, and public administration may still
depend heavily on manual systems. In that environment, the continued creation
of specialized commissions and administrative offices cannot be considered in
isolation. The state must also consider the opportunity cost of maintaining
them.
The issue, therefore, is not only whether an institution is legally
established. It is whether the institution represents a reasonable use of
scarce public resources.
The Empirical
Reality of Personnel Bloat in the 2026 Budget
The fiscal problem becomes even clearer when public expenditure is examined
from the perspective of personnel costs. According to the figures cited in this
analysis, approximately 69% of the state's discretionary operational
capacity is consumed by personnel expenses, including wages, salaries,
and staffing-related costs. This leaves roughly 31% for non-payroll
operational and capital expenditure.
Such a high personnel burden has consequences beyond the size of the civil
service. It affects what government can actually do with the resources that
remain after salaries have been paid.
One consequence is what may be described as the "Empty
Desk" effect. The state may have employees in place, but those
employees may lack the resources needed to perform their jobs effectively.
Teachers may work without adequate teaching materials, doctors may work without
sufficient medicines, and police officers may lack fuel, equipment, or other
basic operational resources. The result is a public administration in which the
formal existence of personnel does not necessarily translate into effective
service delivery.
The same pressure affects infrastructure. When personnel expenditure absorbs
most of the available fiscal space, less money remains for capital investment,
maintenance, and the development of public assets. Infrastructure may therefore
deteriorate not because government has no employees, but because too little of
the available budget remains for the physical and operational requirements of
government.
The third problem is fiscal vulnerability. A government with very little
flexibility after meeting its payroll obligations has limited capacity to
absorb an unexpected fall in revenue or a wider economic shock. A reduction in
trade revenue, for example, can quickly create pressure for additional
borrowing, increased dependence on external assistance, or delays in salary
payments.
These problems give practical significance to the constitutional argument.
Administrative expansion is not simply a matter of how many institutions appear
on a government organizational chart. Each additional institution can add
permanent personnel and operating costs to an already constrained fiscal
system.
From this broader perspective, the "parasitic drain"
refers not to individual officers who may or may not be acting improperly. It
refers to a pattern of priority inversion: scarce public
revenue is increasingly committed to maintaining an expanding administrative
structure and payroll while essential state functions remain under-resourced.
The central concern is therefore systemic. When public offices can be
created and funded without effective legislative scrutiny, the state risks
directing resources toward institutional expansion rather than toward the
public functions those resources are ultimately intended to serve.
V. Parliamentary Failure: The Abdication of Fiscal Guardrails
Executive expansion is only one side of the problem. The other is the
failure of Parliament to use the constitutional powers available to it.
When Parliament fails to question or scrutinize executive-created
institutions during the budget process, it weakens its own role as guardian of
the Power of the Public Purse. The executive may create an
administrative body, but that does not by itself guarantee that Parliament must
finance it.
This distinction is crucial. Institutional creation and public
funding are separate questions. An executive decree may create an
administrative arrangement, but the request for public money brings that
institution directly into the legislative budget process. At that point,
Parliament has the opportunity—and the constitutional responsibility—to ask
whether the proposed expenditure is justified.
If Parliament simply accommodates non-statutory bodies through annual
appropriation acts or accepts executive reallocations without meaningful
scrutiny, the problem compounds over time. More offices are added, existing
mandates begin to overlap, administrative costs increase, and responsibility
becomes increasingly difficult to identify.
The result is not simply a larger bureaucracy. It is a less coherent system
of public administration in which institutions may perform overlapping
functions while operating with different levels of legal and parliamentary
accountability.
VI. Corrective Remedy: Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium
The appropriate response is not necessarily to abolish every institution
created by executive action. Nor should Parliament assume that every such
institution must automatically be rejected because it lacks a separate enabling
statute.
The more important corrective is to restore Parliament's role as the fiscal
and legislative gatekeeper. When an institution seeks public funding,
Parliament should examine the institution, its functions, its necessity, and
its cost before deciding whether to appropriate public money.
1. The Gatekeeping
Mandate: Rejecting Automatic Entitlement to Public Funds
Article 55(1) gives the House of Representatives authority
to debate, amend, and approve the national budget. Article 53
also provides part of the constitutional framework for parliamentary oversight
of public institutions and executive action.
Parliament therefore should not treat the executive's proposed budget as a
document that merely requires formal approval. The executive may propose an
institution and request funding for it, but its unilateral creation of that
institution does not automatically give it an entitlement to public financing.
This is where Parliament's fiscal gatekeeping role becomes decisive.
When a non-statutory or otherwise executive-created institution appears in
the proposed budget, Parliament should ask whether the institution performs a
genuine public function and whether that function justifies the expenditure
requested. The process does not have to operate on the rigid assumption that every
form of public funding is constitutionally prohibited until an enabling Act has
first been enacted. Instead, the budget process itself can operate as
a constitutional filtering mechanism.
The process can be understood in three stages:
Executive establishment and funding request. The executive
establishes or proposes the institution and submits the relevant budget
request.
Parliamentary interrogation. Parliament examines the
proposed institution and requires the executive to explain its mandate,
necessity, expected public benefit, and financial implications.
Legislative determination. If Parliament is persuaded that
the institution performs a demonstrable public function, it may approve the
requested appropriation. It may also require the institution to be placed on a
proper statutory footing. If Parliament is not persuaded, it may exercise its
constitutional budgetary authority under Article 55 and decline to appropriate
the requested funds.
This approach preserves the constitutional role of both branches. The
executive can propose and administer; Parliament decides whether public money
should be appropriated for the proposed activity.
2. The Three-Part
Legislative Evaluation Framework
Before approving a budget line for a decree-created or non-statutory
institution, Parliament should apply three basic tests.
First: Public Necessity. What concrete public need does the
institution address? The executive should provide a clear explanation of the
problem the institution is intended to solve, the service it will provide, and
the public benefit expected from it. Political assertions alone should not be
enough.
Second: Institutional Overlap and Subsidiarity. Does the
proposed mandate duplicate or conflict with functions already assigned to an
existing constitutional or statutory institution? If an existing body can
perform the same function effectively, the government should explain why
another institution is necessary.
Third: Fiscal Sustainability and Resource Burden. What will
the institution cost over time? The assessment should include salaries,
staffing, offices, equipment, infrastructure, and recurring administrative
expenditure. Given the reported 69% personnel burden, the question is
particularly important: can the state sustain another institutional structure
without further reducing the resources available for essential services and
capital investment?
Together, these three tests would give parliamentary budget review a more
meaningful institutional function. The question would not simply be whether an
institution has requested money. The question would be whether the institution
is necessary, sufficiently distinct, and financially sustainable.
VII. Comparative
Case Illustration: Structural Efficiency vs. Extra-Constitutional Redundancy
The difference between the two institutional models can be summarized as
follows:
|
Operational
Domain |
Constitutional
/ Statutory PAI — Legitimate Track |
Non-Statutory
/ Extra-Constitutional PAI — Patronage Risk |
|
Legal
Mandate |
Based on the Constitution
or legislation enacted by Parliament. |
Created through an
executive decree, administrative circular, or presidential taskforce without
legislative establishment as an independent institution. |
|
Fiscal
Accountability |
Subject to established
audit procedures and parliamentary budgetary scrutiny. |
May operate through
discretionary allocations, donor-related arrangements, or reallocations that
receive less institutional scrutiny. |
|
Operational
Output |
Performs recognized public
functions such as education, health, security, justice, revenue
administration, or other statutory services. |
May consume salaries,
office space, and administrative resources while performing functions that
overlap with existing institutions. |
The comparison should not be understood to mean that every non-statutory
institution is useless or that every statutory institution is efficient. The
point is more precise: legal foundation and functional necessity are
separate questions, and both must be examined.
An institution may provide a useful service while still requiring a stronger
legal foundation. Likewise, an institution may have a valid legal foundation
but nevertheless become redundant or inefficient. The proper response is
therefore not to judge institutions solely by their names or their claimed
functions, but to examine their legal basis, actual mandate, relationship with
existing institutions, and cost to the public.
Conclusion
Somaliland cannot afford unlimited institutional expansion while operating
within a tightly constrained fiscal environment and carrying a personnel burden
that consumes approximately 69% of available fiscal space.
The issue is not simply the number of offices in government. It is the
constitutional process through which those offices are created, funded, and
maintained.
The executive has an important administrative role under Article 90,
including the authority to organize the internal machinery of government. That
authority should not, however, be treated as a general power to create
independent public institutions without meaningful legislative involvement.
At the same time, Parliament must do more than criticize executive expansion
after the fact. Its most effective constitutional instrument is its control
over public expenditure. The executive may establish an administrative body and
request funding for it, but the existence of an executive decree does not
itself create a constitutional entitlement to parliamentary appropriation.
Parliament should therefore use the budget process as a genuine
constitutional gatekeeping mechanism. It should ask whether a proposed
institution is necessary, whether its functions overlap with existing
institutions, and whether the state can reasonably sustain its costs. Where the
case is convincing, Parliament can approve the appropriation and, where
appropriate, require formal statutory regularization. Where the case is not
convincing, Parliament can refuse the requested appropriation.
This approach restores the proper balance between the two branches. The
executive remains capable of administering government, while Parliament retains
its constitutional responsibility to determine how public resources are
authorized and allocated.
Constitutional equilibrium does not require an inactive executive or a
hostile legislature. It requires each branch to exercise its own powers within
the constitutional framework. Executive administration should not
become a substitute for legislation, and parliamentary budget approval should
not become a passive formality. The protection of the public purse is
one of the principal means through which constitutional government protects the
public interest.

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